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We consider the security of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol for quantum key dis-
tribution, with arbitrary individual imperfections simultaneously in the source and detectors. We
provide the secure key generation rate, and show that three parameters must be bounded to ensure
security; the basis dependence of the source, a detector blinding parameter, and a detector leakage
parameter. The system may otherwise be completely uncharacterized and contain large losses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for dis-
tributing a secure key to two communicating parties, Al-
ice and Bob. The most common QKD protocol, BB84
[1], has been proved secure by a number of approaches,
some of which include different kinds of imperfections in
the equipment [2–7]. The ultimate goal of QKD security
analysis is to take all kinds of imperfections into account,
at least those that cannot be eliminated completely by
a suitable design of the setup. So far, most of the avail-
able security proofs for BB84 consider imperfections at
the source or detector separately. An exception is the
work by Gottesman et. al. [5], which treats the security
in the presence of source flaws and a squashing detector
with certain, limited imperfections. Also of interest is
the paper by Hayashi [8], which combines finite length
key analysis with photon number imperfections at the
source. Proving security for a realistic system with arbi-
trary imperfections, simultaneously in the source, chan-
nel, and detectors, has so far been an open problem.
A particularly suitable approach for practical QKD is
to limit the assumptions about the equipment. By con-
sidering entanglement-based protocols with detectors in
both ends of the system [9], one can prove security in
a rather general setting [10], assuming collective attacks
and individual imperfections [11]. While these protocols
and security proofs are promising, they do not neces-
sarily provide security for realistic devices. All realistic
systems have large losses due to the channel and limited
detector efficiencies. An eavesdropper Eve may use im-
perfect detection efficiencies to effectively control Bob’s
basis choice [12, 13]. Using this detection-loophole, she
may perform the identical measurement as Bob to obtain
a perfect copy of the key [26].
In this work we will prove security for BB84 with any
combination of individual imperfections as well as chan-
nel losses. By individual imperfections we mean that
the operation of the devices for a particular signal is in-
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dependent of earlier signals. To obtain such generality,
we describe the actual physics in the protocol, rather
than using e.g. squashing models with “tagging”. Thus,
the detectors are described as a basis-dependent quan-
tum operation on the actual state space, in front of a
three-outcome measurement (“0”, “1”, and “vacuum”).
Describing the detector in this way also enables an ele-
gant solution to the problem of combining errors in the
detectors and errors in the source.
To get around the detection loophole, we anticipate
that at least two parameters must be known or bounded
about the system; one for the source and one for the
detectors. Our proof is formulated with two such param-
eters; the basis dependence of the source and a detec-
tor blinding parameter. In addition to these parameters,
we include a third parameter quantifying leakage from
Bob’s detectors. Once these parameters are bounded,
the system may contain bit and basis leakage from Al-
ice, multimode behavior, basis-dependent misalignments,
losses, nonlinearities, basis-dependent threshold detec-
tors with detector efficiency mismatch and information
leakage, dark counts, etc. In that sense, our proof of-
fers the generality of the entanglement-based scenarios
[11], applies to realistic scenarios with loss, and provides
universal composable security against the most general
attacks.
II. PROTOCOL
Consider the following BB84-like protocol, the actual
protocol. Alice chooses basis a = Z or a = X randomly
according to some probability distribution and prepares
the state |χa〉, where
|χZ〉 = √pZ |0〉|β0〉+
√
1− pZ |1〉|β1〉, (1a)
|χX〉 = √pX |+〉|β+〉+
√
1− pX |−〉|β−〉. (1b)
Here pZ and pX are probabilities, |0〉, |1〉 are some or-
thonormal qubit basis states, and |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2.
Alice measures the qubit in the a-basis (this measure-
ment can be delayed to the end of the protocol). She
repeats the procedure to obtain a large number of “β
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2states”, which are sent via Eve to Bob. These β states
include any system that is correlated to Alice’s system
and to which Eve has access. Note that Eve is free to
send anything to Bob, including parts of β and/or any
state of her own choice. Depending on Alice’s source
the four different β-states will differ in photon number
statistics, polarization, wavelength, etc. Any leakage in
non-photonic side channels will also be included in these
states. With no loss of generality, the β-states are as-
sumed pure; if they were mixed, we could simply purify
them, sending the auxiliary, purifying system to Eve.
For each state received by Bob, he chooses a “basis”
variable b according to some probability distribution and
conducts measurements Mb. The measurements Mb have
three outcomes, “0”, “1”, and “vacuum”. When he ob-
tains “0” or “1” he publicly acknowledges receipt. After
transmission, Alice and Bob broadcast a and b. When
b = X they openly compare their measurement results
to estimate the fraction qX of nonvacuum events at Bob
when a = X, the corresponding error rate δX , and the
fraction qph of nonvacuum events when a = Z. After
this estimation only the n states for which a = b = Z
are kept. Discarding all events where Bob detected “vac-
uum”, Alice and Bob each end up with nqZ bits. Alice’s
bits are the raw key.
We will now summarize Koashi’s generic framework
for security proofs [14, 15]. Imagine a virtual experiment
where Alice measures her final nqZ qubits (correspond-
ing to the raw key) in the X-basis instead of Z-basis. In
this virtual experiment, instead of measuring MZ , Bob
now tries to predict the outcome of Alice’s measurement.
To do this, he may do whatever is permitted by quantum
mechanics, as long as he does not alter the information
given to Eve. Let HvirtX(A|B = µ) denote the entropy of
Alice’s result, given measurement result µ in Bob’s pre-
diction. Let HvirtX(A|B = µ) ≤ H for some constant
H. Since the uncertainty after Bob’s prediction is less
than H, the entropic uncertainty relation [16] suggests
that anyone (including Eve) cannot predict the outcome
of a Z-basis measurement by Alice with less entropy than
nqZ −H. This indicates that Alice can extract nqZ −H
bits of secret key. The quantity H is to be found from
the estimated parameters qX , δX , and qph [27]. The de-
tailed proof [14] of the fact that Alice can extract nqZ−H
bits of secret key is based upon the universal, compos-
able security definition, and considers the actual privacy
amplification protocol by universal hashing.
To ensure that Bob has the identical key, we note that
it does not matter to Eve what Bob does (as long as he
gives the same receipt acknowledgment information); he
can as well measure MZ . Then Bob obtains the identical
raw key from his measurement result and nqZh(δZ) extra
bits of error correction information from Alice, consum-
ing nqZh(δZ) of previous established secure key. Here
h(·) is the binary Shannon entropy function, and the er-
ror rate δZ can be estimated by sacrificing a subset of
the raw key (whose size we can neglect in the asymptotic
limit n → ∞). We therefore obtain the asymptotic net
secure key generation rate
RZ ≥ 1−H/nqZ − h(δZ). (2)
III. INDIVIDUAL IMPERFECTIONS IN THE
DETECTORS
We first consider the situation where Alice’s source is
perfect (|χX〉 = |χZ〉) and Bob’s detectors can be sub-
ject to any kind of individual imperfections. With the
understanding that Bob chooses his bit randomly for co-
incidence counts [3, 5], his detectors can be modeled by
a basis-dependent quantum operation (EZ and EX) in
front of a measurement with three possible outcomes:
“0”, “1”, and “vacuum”. Note that there is no need to
require a squash model [5, 17, 18] in our proof as Bob’s
basis selector is included into the basis-dependent quan-
tum operation.
In addition to the optical modes, there may also be
other relevant degrees of freedom in the detector. For
example, dark counts are caused by physical processes
internally in the detector. Thus we consider an extended
state space consisting of the Fock space of all optical
modes in addition to the state space associated with
“electronic” degrees of freedom inside the detectors. Pes-
simistically, we let Eve control all degrees of freedom.
The quantum operations EZ and EX are decomposed
as follows: First there is a basis-dependent quantum op-
eration (FZ and FX) acting on the Fock space associated
with all optical modes. This operation contains Bob’s ba-
sis selector. The operations FZ and FX are assumed pas-
sive in the sense that if vacuum is incident to all modes,
there will also be vacuum at the output. Then there is
another quantum operation F describing interaction be-
tween the photonic state and internal degrees of freedom
in the detectors, see Fig. 1. The quantum operation F
may be active in the sense that even though vacuum is
incident to all optical modes, there may be nonvacuum
detections. When the optical modes contain the vacuum
state, we can (pessimistically) assume that Eve has full
control over Bob’s detectors through F ; in other words,
she controls the dark counts directly with the “electronic”
modes. The quantum operation F is assumed to be inde-
pendent of Bob’s basis choice. This assumption is natural
as Bob’s basis choice does not influence internal degrees
of freedom in the detector. In other words, when Eve
emits the vacuum in all optical modes, Bob’s basis choice
will not affect the detection statistics.
To achieve a completely general detector model, we
should not only let Eve control the detectors; in addition
we must let information return to Eve. Consider the case
where Bob has chosen the Z-basis. In the most general
case the information leakage is quantum, i.e., a part of
the total Hilbert space is given directly to Eve. Replacing
this part of the Hilbert space by some standard state
σ2, we can quantify the leakage Z by the trace distance
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FIG. 1: Bob’s detectors consist of a basis-dependent quantum
operation (EZ = F ◦ FZ and EX = F ◦ FX) in front of a
three-outcome measurement. The fact that Eve gets arrival
information from Bob is included through a dedicated vacuum
measurement preceding Bob’s three-outcome measurement.
On the input side of F , the lower line contains the electronic
modes of the detector, while on the output side of F , the
lower line indicates the part of the Hilbert space leaked to
Eve. Alice’s classical bit, indicated in the upper part of the
figure, is included in the state σ.
D(·, ·) as follows:
Z = min
σ2
max
ρ
D(σ, σ1 ⊗ σ2). (3)
Here ρ is any state at Bob’s input (including Alice’s part
of the system, see Fig. 1), σ is the state of Alice and
Bob before leakage, and σ1 = Tr2(σ) is the state of the
remaining Hilbert space after leakage. Note that these
density operators refer to a single signal, not the entire
block of n signals. The parameter Z measures the cor-
relation between the leaked quantum state and the state
of Alice and Bob, maximized over states sent by Eve.
More precisely, Z is the maximum probability that the
actual state before leakage can be distinguished from the
state where the leaked part is replaced by the standard
state σ2 [19]. Eq. (3) has another very useful physical
interpretation: Choose a fixed σ2, dependent on EZ , but
independent of the state coming from Eve. For any σ,
the probability of a measurement result of σ1 ⊗ σ2 devi-
ates no more than Z from the corresponding probability
when measuring σ [19].
Although we now have a general detector model, we
add one little feature. In the actual protocol, Eve gets
to know whether a particular signal was detected. This
can be included as an extra projective measurement with
projectors P and I − P , where I − P is a projector onto
the subspace corresponding to detection result “vacuum”
in Bob’s measurement. Clearly this addition does not
disturb Bob’s measurement statistics. The composed
measurement consisting of EZ followed by this projec-
tive measurement will be referred to as Eve’s vacuum
measurement. It can be described by some POVM ele-
ments E and I−E, where I−E corresponds to detection
result “vacuum” at Bob. Including Eve’s vacuum mea-
“0”
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FIG. 2: Bob’s setup for virtual X-basis prediction. The
optical and electronic modes are denoted by a single line in
this figure.
surement separately, rather than absorbing it into the
quantum leakage (3), leads to a better rate. The reason
is that the information from the vacuum measurement
is classical and available to Bob, as opposed to general,
leaked quantum information.
Having described the model, we now turn to the se-
curity analysis. As before, Alice extracts the key in the
Z-basis. In Koashi’s security proof, Bob wants to predict
the outcome of a virtual X-basis measurement by Alice.
In this virtual prediction there is only one important re-
striction: Bob is not allowed to alter the information
going to Eve. Thus Eve’s vacuum measurement must be
retained.
The setup used by Bob to perform the virtual X-basis
prediction is depicted in Fig. 2. The state from Eve
is incident to a first vacuum measurement, Bob’s vac-
uum measurement, a projective measurement with cer-
tain projectors Q and I − Q, corresponding to results
“nonvacuum” and “vacuum”, respectively. Then it goes
through the quantum operation EZ , and leaks partially
back to Eve. The remaining part is measured by Eve’s
vacuum measurement, and sent through a reversal oper-
ation. The goal of the reversal operation is to reverse the
effect of the vacuum measurement, so that the combined
operation consisting of Eve’s vacuum measurement and
the reversal operation is identity, with a certain prob-
ability. Finally, the quantum operation EX and Bob’s
three-outcome measurement are applied.
To analyze Bob’s virtual prediction, we note the fol-
lowing observations. The quantum operation EZ can be
viewed as a unitary operation on an extended state space.
Moreover, since Bob’s reversal operation does not have
to be realizable in practice (only in principle) we may
assume that Bob has access to any extra degrees of free-
dom used to “unitarize” EZ . He does not have access to
the quantum state leaked to Eve; however, the leakage
disturbs the probabilities of Bob’s prediction by no more
than Z . Therefore, for the moment we can ignore the
leakage, taking it into account in the final expression for
the key rate.
To proceed, we need the following results.
Lemma 1 (Koashi and Ueda [20]). Let E, acting on
a Hilbert space H, be a POVM element associated with
some measurement M . If any state in some sub-
space Q ⊆ H is measured with M , the measured state
4can be reversed to the original state, with maximum
joint probability of outcome E and successful reversal
inf |Φ〉∈Q,〈Φ|Φ〉=1〈Φ|E|Φ〉. It is possible to know when the
reversal is successful or not.
Lemma 2 The output of a quantum operation Eb is mea-
sured with projectors P0, P1, and I−P0−P1, correspond-
ing to detection results “0”, “1”, and “vacuum”, respec-
tively, or alternatively, with P ≡ P0 +P1 and I −P . Let
I − Q be a projector onto an input subspace of Eb that
leads to detection result “vacuum” with certainty. The
measurement statistics are not changed by the presence
of a projective measurement {Q, I −Q} before Eb.
Proof: Lemma 2 is not as trivial as it may appear at first
sight since states in the support of Q may also lead to de-
tection result “vacuum”. Thus the measurement before
Eb gives extra information. Nevertheless, the quantum
operation Eb can be viewed as a unitary transformation
on an extended Hilbert space, with a standard state as
auxiliary input. Clearly, it does not matter if we mea-
sure the extra degrees of freedom at the output. This
measurement can be constructed so that the total out-
put measurement distinguishes between input states in
the support of Q or I −Q. Then, an input measurement
{Q, I −Q} is redundant.
More precisely, the unitary operator can be chosen
such that the projective measurement at the output is
implemented as a measurement of a single qutrit in the
computational basis. Thus it transforms
|01〉|0〉aux → |v〉|ψ1〉, (4a)
|02〉|0〉aux → |v〉|ψ2〉, (4b)
and
|11〉|0〉aux → |v〉|φv1〉+ |0〉|φ01〉+ |1〉|φ11〉, (5a)
|12〉|0〉aux → |v〉|φv2〉+ |0〉|φ02〉+ |1〉|φ12〉, (5b)
etc. Here |0i〉 and |1i〉 are bases for the support of I −Q
and Q, respectively, |0〉aux is the auxiliary standard state,
and |0〉〈0| = P0, |1〉〈1| = P1, and |v〉〈v| = I−P0−P1. The
ψ- and φ-vectors are (not necessarily normalized) states
of the remaining part of the output state space. Since
〈1i|0j〉 = 0, we have 〈φvi |ψj〉 = 0 for any i, j. Thus, by a
measurement of the ψ or φ part of the output state space
in addition to the qutrit, we can distinguish between the
|0i〉 states and |1i〉 states.
We define the projector I − Q so as to project onto
vacuum in all photonic modes, and onto the biggest sub-
space of the “electronic” modes that gives detection re-
sult “vacuum” in Eve’s vacuum measurement. The or-
thogonal subspace, which is the support of Q, is denoted
Q. Lemma 2 ensures that Bob’s vacuum measurement
does not change the statistics of Eve’s vacuum measure-
ment. When Eve’s vacuum measurement gives result
“vacuum”, or the reversal operation is not successful,
the reversal operation is assumed to output a state in
the support of I −Q. Thus in these cases the output of
Bob’s virtual prediction is “vacuum” with certainty.
If the outcome of Bob’s vacuum measurement is “vac-
uum”, the outcome of Eve’s vacuum measurement is
“vacuum”, and the reversal operation is successful with
certainty. Suppose the outcome of Bob’s vacuum mea-
surement is “nonvacuum”. According to Lemma 1,
the maximum joint probability of result E in Eve’s
vacuum measurement and successful reversal is ηZ =
inf |Φ〉∈Q,〈Φ|Φ〉=1〈Φ|E|Φ〉. When result E and the reversal
is successful (and Bob knows when it is), the statistics of
Bob’s measurement compared to Alice’s virtual X-basis
measurement will be identical to that of Alice’s and Bob’s
ordinary parameter estimation in the X-basis, except for
any disturbance by Bob’s vacuum measurement. Accord-
ing to Lemma 2 such disturbance does not exist. The
number of detection events E in Eve’s vacuum measure-
ment is nqZ ; of these nqXηZ is successfully reversed and
detected as “0” or “1” in Bob’s virtual prediction. Thus
we obtain H ≤ (nqZ − nqXηZ) + nqXηZh(δX), which
gives us the rate
RZ ≥ ηZqX/qZ(1− h(δX))− h(δZ). (6)
The parameter ηZ = inf |Φ〉∈Q,〈Φ|Φ〉=1〈Φ|E|Φ〉 is the
minimum probability that a state in Q gives result E by
Eve. This parameter has a clear physical interpretation.
When vacuum is incident to the optical modes, recall
that with no loss of generality we may assume that Eve
has full control of the detectors through the “electronic”
modes. Then there are no losses of her excitation in
the “electronic” modes through the quantum operation
F . Thus, we identify ηZ as the minimum probability
that a nonvacuum photonic state is detected by Bob. In
other words, 1 − ηZ is the maximum probability that a
nonvacuum photonic state is absorbed in the detectors
and detected as vacuum in the actual setup (Fig. 1).
So far we have ignored the effect of any quantum
leakage from the detectors. Parameterizing the leak-
age by (3), Z quantifies the maximum deviation of any
measurement probabilities. In the absence of leakage,
the probabilities of correct and incorrect predictions are
qXηZ(1− δX) and qXηZδX , respectively, while the prob-
ability of vacuum result is 1− qXηZ . When there is leak-
age, in the worst case these probabilities are changed to
qXηZ(1− δX)− Z , qXηZδX + Z − ξ, and 1− qXηZ + ξ,
respectively. Here ξ is an unknown parameter satisfying
0 ≤ ξ ≤ Z . Of the nqZ nonvacuum results in Eve’s
vacuum measurement, there are n(qXηZ− ξ) nonvacuum
results in Bob’s virtual prediction. This leads to
H ≤ nqZ − n(qXηZ − ξ)
+ n(qXηZ − ξ)h
(
qXηZδX + Z − ξ
qXηZ − ξ
)
≤ nqZ − nqXηZ + nqXηZh
(
δX +
Z
qXηZ
)
. (7)
The last inequality in (7) can be found after some algebra
using the facts that h(u)− h(u−∆) ≥ h′(u)∆ for ∆ ≥ 0
5and u ≤ 1/2, and h′(u)(1 − u) ≥ 1 for u ≤ 0.277. Here
we have set u = δX +
Z
qXηZ
.
This gives the rate
RZ ≥ ηZ qX
qZ
[
1− h
(
δX +
Z
qXηZ
)]
− h(δZ), (8)
for δX +
Z
qXηZ
≤ 0.277. An expression for the rate,
also valid for 0.277 ≤ δX + ZqXηZ ≤ 0.5, can be derived
straightforwardly; however, this regime is only relevant
for very small δZ , and large δX and/or
Z
qXηZ
.
IV. INDIVIDUAL IMPERFECTIONS IN THE
ENTIRE SYSTEM
From the previous section we note that when the re-
versal operation is successful (and Bob knows when it
is), the measurement statistics in the prediction becomes
identical to the statistics if Bob measured in the X-
basis. This makes it possible to consider simultane-
ous imperfections at the source and detector. We may
then consider the case where Alice creates a general
state ρa depending on the basis choice a. The basis de-
pendence of the source is characterized by the fidelity
F (ρZ , ρX) ≡ Tr(√ρZρX√ρZ) 12 . We let this dependence
be bounded by a parameter ∆ defined by F ≥ 1 − 2∆.
By Uhlmann’s theorem there exist purifications, |χa〉 of
ρa, such that 〈χZ | χX〉 = 1−2∆. We note that |χa〉 can
be expressed as in Eq. (1).
Again, we first ignore the detector leakage, taking it
into account in the final expression for the rate. Since
Bob wants to predict Alice’s virtual X-basis measure-
ment on |χZ〉, the parameters δX and qX in (6) must be
replaced with δph and qph respectively. Here δph is the
error rate when Alice measures her part of |χZ〉 in the
X-basis and Bob measures his part using MX .
In BB84 such a measurement is not actually per-
formed, but δph can be bounded from the measured error
and transmission rates. We expand the statistical argu-
ment from [14] to include ”vacuum” as a possible mea-
surement result. Assume that for the systems used in the
random sampling Alice chooses her basis by measuring a
quantum coin in the Z-basis. Then these systems can be
described by state |Ψ〉 = (|χZ〉 |0〉 + |χX〉 |1〉)/
√
2, with
the last system being that of the quantum coin.
We then consider the situations where Alice and Bob
both conduct X-basis measurements. For each measure-
ment a variable t is assigned the value t = 0 if their
results are the same, t = 1 if there is an error, and t = 2
if Bob gets no result. Alice then measures her quantum
coin in the Z-basis, getting the result c. We obtain the
following conditional probabilities.
p(t = 0|c = 1) = qX(1− δX) (9a)
p(t = 0|c = 0) = qph(1− δph) (9b)
p(t = 1|c = 1) = qXδX (9c)
p(t = 1|c = 0) = qphδph (9d)
p(t = 2|c = 1) = 1− qX (9e)
p(t = 2|c = 0) = 1− qph. (9f)
Assuming that the systems used to estimate error and
transmission rates are randomly chosen, the probabilities
given c = 0 are also valid for the systems used to extract
the raw key.
Now assume that for some states Alice measure the
coin in the X-basis getting measurement result c¯. Note
that ∑
j
p(t = j)p(c¯ = 1|t = j) = ∆. (10)
Using (9), (10) and the bound [21]
(1− 2p(c¯ = 1|t = j))2 + (1− 2p(c = 0|t = j))2 ≤ 1
we find
1− 2∆ ≤
∑
j
√
p(t = j|a = Z)p(t = j|a = X) (11)
=
√
qX(1− δX)qph(1− δph) +
√
qXδXqphδph
+
√
(1− qX)(1− qph).
δph can now be taken to be the maximal value for which
the inequality is obeyed.
Similarly to the analysis in the previous section, we
can include detector leakage by modifying the detection
probabilities. As in (8), the leakage is accounted for by
adding a term proportional to the leakage parameter Z ,
δ˜ph ≤ δph + Z
qphηZ
. (12)
We have arrived at our main result.
Theorem 1 In BB84 the basis-dependence of Alice’s
source is bounded by F (ρX , ρZ) ≥ 1 − 2∆. Bob’s detec-
tors are modeled by a passive, basis-dependent quantum
operation (FZ and FX) acting on the multimode photonic
state, followed by a basis-independent quantum operation
(F) describing interaction with internal degrees of free-
dom in the physical detector, followed by a measurement
with three outcomes “0”, “1”, and “vacuum”. Suppose
Eve controls the photonic modes and the internal degrees
of freedom in the detectors, and that a quantum state
leaks back to Eve from the detectors. Then the asymp-
totic secure key generation rate for key extraction in the
Z-basis satisfies
RZ ≥ ηZqph/qZ
[
1− h(δ˜ph)
]
− h(δZ), (13)
6provided δ˜ph ≤ 0.277. Here δZ is the estimated error rate
in the Z-basis, δ˜ph is given by (11) and (12), 1−ηZ is the
maximum probability that a non-vacuum photonic state
is detected as “vacuum”, and qph/qZ is the ratio between
the detection rates for Bobs measurements MX and MZ
given that Alice sends in the Z-basis.
The rate (13) is valid for any kinds of individual imper-
fections and loss. The parameters qX , qZ , qph, δX , and
δZ are estimated directly in the protocol, while ∆, ηZ ,
and Z characterize the practical setup.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
In this discussion we assume that the quantum channel
is symmetric with respect to loss i.e. qX = qph = qZ ≡ q.
This will be approximately true for most setups. We
also assume no information returned to Eve from the
detectors, Z = 0, anticipating that such errors could
be avoided by modifying the setup.
In this case (11) reduces to
2∆
q
≥ 1−
√
(1− δX)(1− δph)−
√
δXδph (14)
and the estimated worst possible error rate is:
δph = min
{
1
2
, δX + 8
∆
q
(
(1− ∆
q
)(1− 2δX)
+
√
∆
q
(1− ∆
q
)δX(1− δX)
)} (15)
We see that errors in the source are more critical when
the transmission is low. This is due to Eves control of
the channel, which let her pass to Bob only the systems
where her operation has given her the most information
for the least disturbance. If the source is perfect, ∆ = 0,
loss in the channel does not affect the secret key rate.
The upper limit on the source error for which key gain
is possible is ∆q ≤
√
2−1
2
√
2
≈ 0.146. This is independent of
the detector parameter ηZ , as long as it is nonzero, but
demands error rates equal to zero. For larger error rates
the limit depends heavily on ηZ , Fig. 3.
Channel loss and imperfect sources only contributes
to an increase in δph. A better estimate of δph would
increase the rate. This is related to the method of de-
coy states [22–24], where Alice instead of producing ρZ ,
sometimes produces a decoy state with a different mean
photon number. From the transmission and error rates
for this state, Alice and Bob are able to derive a stricter
bound on δph effectively reducing RZ ’s dependence of
channel loss. To generalize this method, using decoy
states where other properties of the signal state are var-
ied, might prove useful when operating with an imper-
fect source. However creating such states may require
the detailed output statistics of the source, and might be
experimentally difficult in general.
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FIG. 3: Plots showing the security bounds RZ = 0 for dif-
ferent values of ηZ , δ, and
∆
q
. The security bound is found
by setting RZ = 0 in (13). Positive key gain is possible for
parameter values to the left of the curves. We have assumed
Z = 0, δX = δZ = δ and qX = qph = qZ = q.
7Considering the special case of a perfect source, our
rate is larger than the rate proved for restricted detector
flaws in previous literature [6, 7]. Key gain is possible
for ηZ ≤ h(δZ)1−h(δX) . Unlike previous results, our rate ap-
plies to all relevant, individual imperfections at the de-
tectors; for example, mode coupling including misalign-
ments and multiple reflections, nonlinearities, mode de-
pendent losses and detector efficiency mismatch, and any
basis dependence of those effects. Moreover it applies to
threshold detectors with dark counts.
Note that the detector blinding parameter ηZ is not
supposed to contain the transmission efficiency of the
channel. Generally one should factorize EZ = E˜Z ◦ E
and EX = E˜X ◦ E to put as much as possible of the im-
perfections into the basis-independent operation E . By
absorbing E into Eve and treating E˜Z and E˜X as the new
imperfections, ηZ will be maximal. For example, for the
case where reduced detector efficiencies can be described
as beamsplitters in front of ideal detectors, and if there
is no coupling between modes associated with different
logical bits, ηZ is the minimum ratio between the two
detection efficiencies [7]. For detectors that cannot be
modeled by beamsplitters in front of ideal detectors, our
security proof clearly shows the danger associated with
the possibility of detector blinding [13]: If the detection
probability of a nonvacuum state is zero, our proof pre-
dicts zero key rate. For the case where the detectors can
only be partially blinded, our proof can predict positive
rate.
Returning to the general case, the rate is dependent on
∆, ηZ , and Z , in addition to estimated parameters. For
a specific QKD setup, ∆ and Z must be upper bounded,
and ηZ and must be lower bounded. How to deal with
this in practice, is an interesting question for future re-
search.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proved security for arbitrary, individual im-
perfections in a BB84 system. The detector model in-
cludes a basis dependent quantum operation, possibly
with quantum leakage back to Eve, followed by a three-
outcome measurement with outcomes “0”, “1”, and “vac-
uum”. Such a general detector model can describe de-
tector efficiency mismatch, nonlinear blindable behavior,
response to multiple modes, mode coupling and multiple
reflections, misalignments, back-reflection leakage, non-
optical leakage, etc. By reversal of the receipt acknowl-
edgment measurement on Bob’s side (Eve’s vacuum mea-
surement), we show how to treat the general case with
a lossy channel and general, individual imperfections at
the source, combined with the flawed detector.
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